It comes as no surprise that the cost of this approach to the remedy far exceeded KCMSD's budget, or for that matter, its authority to tax. The District Court's remedial plan was proposed for the most part by the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) itself, which is in name a defendant in the suit. 16 Supp., at 412-413. Pp. by Benna Ruth Solomon, Joyce Holmes Benjamin, and Andrew D. Hurwitz; and for Icelean Clark et al. [ Nor did the Court of Appeals issue an order extending the time for the issuance of the mandate, as it may do under Rule 41(a). The remedy must therefore be related to the condition alleged to offend the Constitution. ." denied sub nom. It is accepted by all the parties, as it was by the courts below, that the imposition of a tax increase by a federal court was an extraordinary event. And the important effects of the taxation order discussed here raise additional federalism concerns that counsel against the Court's analysis. (1979); Dayton Bd. I do not acknowledge the troubling departures in today's majority opinion as either necessary or appropriate to ensure full compliance with the Equal Protection Clause and its mandate to eliminate the cause and effects of racial discrimination in the schools. While courts must intervene to stop harmful segregation in schools, its power is bounded by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation. Defendants, and above all defendants that are public entities, act in the highest and best tradition of our legal system when they acknowledge fault and cooperate to suggest remedies. ] A petition for rehearing is designed to bring to the panel's attention points of law or fact that it may have overlooked. 88-64 Argued February 21, 1989 Decided June 19, 1989 491 U.S. 274 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Syllabus In this major school desegregation litigation in Kansas City, Missouri, in which various desegregation remedies were granted against the State of Missouri and other The suggestion that failure to approve judicial taxation here would leave constitutional rights unvindicated rests on a presumption that the District Court's remedy is the only possible cure for the constitutional violations it found. The State challenged the District Courts order. This interpretation is supported by an order of the District Court issued on January 3, 1989. fact, had the very alternative outlined by the Court of Appeals. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Missouri_v._Jenkins&oldid=1063285610, United States Supreme Court cases of the Rehnquist Court, United States school desegregation case law, Short description is different from Wikidata, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0. appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. 1988), which provides with respect to such litigation that the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, "a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." A limited grant of certiorari is not a means by which the Court can pose for itself Fed. for Cert. Instead, the court and the KCMSD decided to make a magnet of the district as a whole. The District Court believed that it had no alternative to imposing a tax increase. In Heine, the Court held that it had no equitable power to impose a tax in order to prevent the plaintiff's right from going without a remedy. (1881) (distinguishing Meriwether, supra). 433 In 1977, the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMD), the school board, and the children of two school board members brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri against the state of Missouri and various suburban school districts or allegedly causing and perpetuating racial segregation in the schools of the city's metropolitan area. Few ends are more important than enforcing the guarantee of equal educational opportunity for our Nation's children. 2. In fact, the taxation power is sought here on behalf of a remedial order unlike any before seen. Cf. 349 Missouri v. Jenkins - Case Briefs - 1988, Case Briefs - 1989, Case Briefs - 1994 Missouri v. Jenkins PETITIONER:Missouri RESPONDENT:Kalima Jenkins et al. This puts the conclusion before the premise. [495 The Eighth Circuit, unlike other Circuits, does not have a published practice of treating all suggestions for rehearing in banc, no matter how styled, as containing both petitions for panel rehearing and suggestions for rehearing in banc. Missouri v. Jenkins, Syllabus by the Court In an action under 42 U.S.C. Id., at 685. at 111a, and that apportionment of damages between the State and KCMSD according to fault was supported by the doctrine of comparative fault in tort, which had been adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S. W. 2d 11 (1983). U.S. 381 Three months later, the District Court adopted a plan requiring $187,450,334 in further capital improvements. In fact, the District Court acknowledged in its very first remedial order that the development of a remedy in this case would involve "a choice among a wide range of possibilities." Use this button to switch between dark and light mode. Annual Subscription ($175 / Year). . Rather, it found only that the taxation orders were necessary to fund the particular remedy it had devised. Proc. United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Citation 491 US 274 (1989) Argued Feb 21, 1989 Decided Jun 19, 1989 Advocates Bruce Farmer Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, argued the cause for the petitioners Jay Topkis argued the cause for the respondents Facts of the case 128 ] The District Court authorized $12,972,727 for operation of the six magnet schools and $12,877,330 for further capital improvements at those schools. 1). U.S. 33, 78]. A federal district court, after ordering the desegregation of the Kansas City school district, ordered the state of Missouri and the district to . Dist. Invested by whom? With all respect, it is this third group of cases that applies. of Education v. Penick, U.S. 33, 54] This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to rule that KCMSD should be responsible for funding its share of the remedy. . U.S. 449 443 North Carolina Bd. (1979) (whether a state agency "may be ordered actually to promulgate regulations having effect as a matter of state law may well be doubtful"). That being so, the authority to levy a higher tax would have to come from the federal court. If the filing was no more than a suggestion for rehearing in banc, as respondents insist, the petition for certiorari was untimely. 402 491 U. S. 284-289. U.S. 33, 73] Brief Fact Summary. This final iteration of the Missouri v. Jenkins cases (this case is deemedMissouri v. Jenkins III) marks the end of the Courts involvement in the 18-year-long litigation. "Proposition C" allocates one cent of every dollar raised by the state sales tax to a schools trust fund and requires school districts to reduce property taxes by an amount equal to 50% of the previous year's sales tax receipts in the district. Missouri v. Jenkins | Oyez - {{meta.fullTitle}} On September 16, the State filed with the court a document styled "State Appellants' Petition for Rehearing En Banc." This case thus stands in contrast to United States v. Buljubasic, supra, where the Court of Appeals allowed the mandate to issue even though the appellant had filed a "Petition for Rehearing En Banc." On September 16, the State filed with the court a document styled "State Appellants' Petition for Rehearing En Banc." Pp. The State's argument that the funding ordered by the District Court violates the principles of equity and comity because the remedial order itself was excessive aims at the scope of the remedy, rather than the manner in which the remedy is to be funded, and thus falls outside this Court's limited grant of certiorari. Brief for Respondents at 7, Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) (No. The court also denied as premature a motion by KCMSD to approve a proposed property tax levy of $4.23 for fiscal year 1989-1990. U.S. 1 1961). Although a District Court necessarily has discretion to fashion a remedy for a school district unconstitutionally segregated in law, such remedial power is not unlimited and may not be extended to purposes beyond the elimination of racial discrimination in public schools. See 855 F.2d, at 1314. 35(a). 1986) (en banc), cert. 291 (1987). O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England. Pet. The ultimate inquiry is whether the constitutional violator has complied in good faith with the decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable. 1983, on which respondents' complaint is based, is authority enough to require each tortfeasor to pay its share of the cost of the remedy if it can, and apportionment of the cost is part of the equitable power of the District Court. (1984); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (in banc), cert. The Court's discussion today, and its stated approval of the "method for future funding" found "preferable" by the Court of Appeals, is unnecessary for the decision in this case. MISSOURI, et al., Petitioners v. Kalima JENKINS et al. place in the KCMSD without a federal court order. (1971). The Supreme Court majority interpreted Brown v. Board of Education as restricting only de jure segregation and referred to Milliken v. Bradley and other precedents as applying only to intra-district desegregation. for Cert. U.S. 582, 591 County of Macon has little relevance to the present case, for KCMSD's obligation to fund the desegregation remedy arises from its operation of a segregated school system in violation of the Constitution, not from a contract between KCMSD and respondents. (1880); id., at 515 (Field, J., concurring in judgment) ("[W]hen the law is gone, and the office of the collector abolished, there is nothing upon which the courts can act"); cf. The District Court's school desegregation orders, which required the State of Missouri to fund across-the-board salary increases and to continue to fund remedial education programs, went beyond the court's remedial authority. (1879), held that mandamus would not lie to force a local government to levy taxes in excess of the limits contained in a statute in effect at the time the county incurred its bonded indebtedness, for the explicit limitation on the taxing power became part of the contract, the bondholders had notice of the limitation and were deemed to have consented to it, and hence no contractual remedy was unconstitutionally impaired by observing [BAD TEXT] he statute. U.S. 33, 57] they are not unlimited," Whitcomb v. Chavis, 2. 433 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 The following criteria must be considered in evaluating a request for attorneys' fees in a common fund.. Dowd v. City of L.A., Case No. (1977). U.S. 717 20. - Legal Principles in this Case for Law Students. U.S. 1, 5 . art. [ And the remedial orders grew more expensive as shortfalls in revenue became more severe. (1947). . The cost of these remedies was to be borne equally by the State and KCMSD. Missouri V Jenkins Case Brief.docx - Missouri V Jenkins Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 61 (1990) (Jenkins II) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). This Court, with full justification, has given latitude to the district judges that must deal with persisting problems of desegregation. First, it was held that federal courts could not by writ of mandamus compel state officers to release funds in the state treasury sufficient to satisfy state bond obligations. U.S. 33, 75] U.S. 294, 299 This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply. 1983, the District Court found that the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) and petitioner State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. . It is true that the Eighth Circuit's original October 14 order stated that there were three "petitions for rehearing en banc pending before the Court" and that all "petitions for rehearing en banc" were denied. (1952). 9 Jenkins v. Missouri, supra, at 34-35. The income tax surcharge was reversed by the Eighth Circuit. alteration of the rights [is] asked, and the finality of the court's first Magnet schools, as the majority opinion notes, ante, at 40, n. 6, offer special programs, As a result, the District Court began to order remedial measures. See National City Bank v. Battisti, 581 F.2d 565 (CA6 1977); Plaquemines Parish School Bd. Under Freeman v. Pitts, three factors inform a courts discretion on continuing a decree to remediate school discrimination: (i) whether compliance exists with those parts of the decree where federal intervention is to be withdrawn; (ii) whether judicial control is necessary to achieve compliance with other parts of the school system; and (iii) whether the district has shown a good-faith adherence to the decree. KCMSD was also directed to issue $150 Casebriefs is concerned with your security, please complete the following, The Bank of the United States: A Case Study, Are We a Nation? But courage and skill must be exercised with due regard for the proper and historic role of the courts. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed those orders. But we did not there state that a district court could never set aside state laws preventing local governments from raising funds sufficient to satisfy their constitutional obligations just because those funds could also be obtained from the States. The Supreme Court added, "To hold otherwise would fail to take account of the obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes upon them."[3]. The very cases cited by the majority show that a federal court has no such authority. To hold otherwise would fail to take account of the obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on them. A district court may not create an intra-district segregation remedial plan with the purpose of attracting nonminority students into the district. Id., at 266. US Supreme Court Opinions and Cases | FindLaw (1879); Heine v. Levee It argued that the State should not fund the teacher salary increase, and it should no longer fund the quality education programs because it has achieved partial unitary status, under. U.S. 33, 38]. . 113a. Since Department of Banking of Nebraska v. Pink, The District Court's January 3, 1989, order does not support, but refutes, the Court's characterization. This case does not involve an order to a local government with plenary taxing power to impose a tax, or an order directed at one whose taxing power has been limited by a state law enacted in order to thwart a federal court order. (Emphasis added.) as containing only suggestions for rehearing in banc. This Court has never approved a remedy of the type adopted by the District Court. The District Court should have made more findings to determine whether the KCMSDs student population was a result of vestiges of past discrimination. denied, A district court may not create an intra-district segregation remedial plan with the purpose of attracting nonminority students into the district. The premise of the Court's analysis, I submit, is infirm. Rather than exercising what it believed to be its power to order a tax increase to fund the remedy, the court chose to impose other means -- including enjoining the effect of one of the state law provisions -- to allow KCMSD to raise additional revenue. 21. Rehearing in banc is a discretionary procedure employed only to address questions of exceptional importance or to maintain uniformity among Circuit decisions. [495 On remand, however, the District Court held that the State and KCMSD were 75% and 25% at fault, respectively, ordered them to share the cost of the remedy in that proportion, and held them jointly and severally liable. [495 U.S. 170 Neither our precedents 200 We also hold, however, that the modifications of the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals do satisfy equitable and constitutional principles governing the District Court's power. There is no occasion in this case to discuss the full implications of Griffin's observation, for it has no application here. Ibid. Respondents did not cross-petition to challenge this aspect of the Court of Appeals' judgment, so the surcharge is not before us. This analysis can be done by looking at state action and not social science. to Pet. The District Court next considered, as the Court of Appeals had directed, how to shift the cost of desegregation to KCMSD. On October 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals denied this and two U.S. 33, 46] The application was returned as untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. (1964)), the court ordered the KCMSD property tax levy raised from $2.05 to $4.00 per $100 of assessed valuation through the 1991-1992 fiscal year. [495 Zimmern v. United States, 400, 408 (WD Mo. If the Court is to take upon itself the power to tax, respect for its own integrity demands that the power be exercised in support of true constitutional principle, not "suburban comparability" and "visual attractiveness. In Von Hoffman, the limitation was disregarded because of the Contract Clause. X, 11(b),(c). It also approved the $142,736,025 budget proposed by KCMSD for implementation of the magnet school plan, as well as the expenditure of $52,858,301 for additional capital improvements. Cf. . Milliken v. Bradley, At the outset, it must be noted that the Court of Appeals made no "modifications" to the District Court's order. 239 H. Bartow Farr III argued the cause for petitioners. 1, begins with the statement that "[t]he Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes. The Federalist No. The State has argued here that the District Court, having found the State and KCMSD jointly and severally liable, should have allowed any monetary obligations that KCMSD [495 For reasons explained below, I agree with the Court that the Eighth Circuit's judgment affirming the District Court's direct levy of a property tax must be reversed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the State's argument that a federal court lacks judicial power to order a tax increase. (1971), and one of the most important considerations governing the exercise of equitable power is a proper respect for the integrity and function of local government institutions. 491 U.S. at 285. We have emphasized that although the "remedial powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task, . 855 F.2d, at 1315. TermsPrivacyDisclaimerCookiesDo Not Sell My Information, Begin typing to search, use arrow keys to navigate, use enter to select, Stay up-to-date with FindLaw's newsletter for legal professionals. To the contrary, 1983 is authority enough to require each tortfeasor to pay its share of the cost of a remedy if it can, and apportionment of the cost is part of the District Court's equitable powers. 855 F.2d, at 1314. App., p. 491, and the Eighth Circuit may have believed, because of the label on the State's papers, that the State intended its filing to be read as containing both. Following is the case brief for Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). In an action under 42 U.S.C. This practice rests on the important distinction between "petitions for rehearing," which are authorized by Rule 40(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and "suggestions for rehearing in banc," which are permitted by Rule 35(b). The plaintiffs and KCMSD might well be seen as parties that have "joined forces apparently for the purpose of extracting funds from the state treasury." Our jurisdiction is limited to particular cases and controversies. public school system suggests that `there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them,' and that . Cf. 102 672 F. Supp. 433 Missouri v. Jenkins - Case Briefs - 1988, Case Briefs - 1989, Case We stand on different ground when we review the modifications to the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals. 377 Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 276 (1989) (Jenkins I). Const., Art. this case, the State styled its filing as a "Petition for Rehearing En Banc." U.S. 167, 169 We have no authority to extend the period for filing except as Congress permits. Did a lack of rising test scores prove that the State had not achieved partial unitary status with regard to the quality education programs under. In this case, where the practice in the relevant market is to bill the work of paralegals separately, the District Court's decision to award separate compensation for paralegals, law clerks, and recent law graduates at prevailing market rates was fully in accord with 1988. 495 U.S. 52-58. The Court is unanimous in its holding, that the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming "the actions that the [district] court has taken to this point," 855 F.2d 1295, 1314 (CA8 1988), must be reversed. U.S. 1, 42 U.S. 1, 42 `the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems' should be entitled to respect." considered, and this Court need never have addressed the question, unless there has been a finding that without the particular remedy at issue the constitutional violation will go unremedied. The Court of Appeals' modifications of the District Court's order satisfy equitable and constitutional principles governing the District Court's power. of Treasury, Missouri v. Jenkins | Oyez - {{meta.fullTitle}} Accepting the District Court's conclusion that state-law limitations prevented KCMSD from raising sufficient funds, it held that those limitations must fall to the Constitution's command and affirmed all of the District Court's actions taken to that point. Finding itself with "no choice but to exercise its broad equitable powers and enter a judgment that will enable the KCMSD to raise its share of the cost of the plan," ibid., and believing that the "United States Supreme Court has stated that a tax may be increased if `necessary to raise funds adequate to . . The Third Circuit, while leaving open the possibility that in some situation a court-ordered tax might be appropriate, has also declined to approve judicial interference in taxation. First, does the Eleventh Amendment prohibit enhancement of a fee award against a State to . See 855 F.2d, at 1318 (Lay, C. J., concurring and dissenting); Brief for Icelean Clark et al. Respondents argue that accepting the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of its October 14 order in this case risks confusion in future cases and invites the lower courts to pick and choose between those parties whose "petitions for rehearing in banc" they view favorably and wish to give additional time for seeking review in this Court, and those whose petitions they wish to give no such aid. It is plain that the KCMSD had no such power under state law. Importantly, the District Court did not order the State to bus children from other school districts because the court did not find any interdistrict segregation violations. Were the orders of the District Court acceptable implementation of a permissible means to remedy the legally mandated segregation? We granted certiorari to consider the State of Missouri's argument that the District Court lacked the power to raise local property taxes. Desegregation of schools involves ending intentional segregation, but does not mean that minority and nonminority students must attend the same schools. Jenkins v. Missouri, 495 U.S. 33, 50-58 (1990). The Constitution does not prevent individuals from choosing to live, work, or go to school together. There the holder of bonds issued by the city sought a writ of mandamus against the city requiring it to levy taxes sufficient to pay interest U.S. 265, 280 , where we stated that a District Court, faced with a country's attempt to avoid desegregation of the public schools by refusing to operate those schools, could "require the [County] Supervisors to exercise the power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a public school system . Footnote 15 U.S. 381 345 U.S. 33, 60] In the present case, KCMSD was ready, willing, and, but for the operation of state law, able to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights itself. 1485 (1984). The Hancock Amendment thus prevents KCMSD from obtaining any revenue increase as a result of increases in the assessed valuation of real property. Id., at 39-41. Commissioners, 19 Wall. X, 11(b),(c). 365 855 F.2d, at 1318-1319. Ferguson Reorganized School Dist. an abstract question. for Cert. Although it allocated the costs of the remedy between the governmental entities, the court determined that several state-law provisions would prevent KCMSD from being able to pay its share. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. (1974) (invalidating interdistrict remedial plan). Missouri v. Jenkins No. Proc. Refer to each styles convention regarding the best way to format page numbers and retrieval dates. 46(c) (which provides the courts of appeals with authority to sit in banc) speak of rehearing in banc, not en banc. to Pet. Id., at 1316-1317. ] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New Mexico by Hal Stratton, Attorney General, Randall W. Childress, Deputy Attorney General, Charles R. Peifer, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Paul Farley, Assistant Attorney General; for Jackson County, Missouri, by John B. Williams and Russell D. Jacobson; for the National Governors' Association et al. 9th Circuit. operate and maintain without racial discrimination a public school system,'" id., at 412 (quoting Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Bd., But in the context of this dispute, it is of vital importance to note the KCMSD demonstrated little concern for the fiscal consequences of the remedy that it helped design. U.S. 141, 145 Both Benson and the LDF employed numerous paralegals, law clerks, and recent law graduates, and the court awarded fees for their work based on market rates, again using current, rather than historic rates, in order to compensate for the delay in payment.
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